# 1NC – NUSO r2 – Dartmouth HM

## 1

### 1NC – Kritik

#### Blackness exists as a metaaporia that interrogates the cyclical ways violence onto blackness is morphed and ultimately appropriated. The 1AC relies on a redemptive narrative of humanity that is fundamentally inaccessible for blacks. Their project is ultimately meant to hide and recreate moments of black death for the sake of redeeming Human life.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 13-17, JMH]

For most critical theorists writing after 1968, the word aporia is used to designate a contradiction in a text or theoretical undertaking. For example, Jacques Derrida suggests an aporia indicates “a point of undecidability, which locates the site at which the text most obviously undermines its own rhetorical structure, dismantles, or deconstructs itself.” But when I say that Black people embody a meta-aporia for political thought and action, the addition of the prefix meta- goes beyond what Derrida and the poststructuralists meant—it raises the level of abstraction and, in so doing, raises the stakes. In epistemology, a branch of philosophy concerned with the theory of knowledge, the prefix meta- is used to mean about (its own category). Metadata, for example, are data about data (who has produced them, when, what format the data are in, and so on). In linguistics, a grammar is considered as being expressed in a metalanguage, language operating on a higher level of abstraction to describe properties of the plain language (and not itself). Metadiscussion is a discussion about discussion (not any one particular topic of discussion but discussion itself). In computer science, a theoretical software engineer might be engaged in the pursuit of metaprogramming (i.e., writing programs that manipulate programs). **Afropessimism**, then, **is** less of a theory and more of **a metatheory: a critical project that, by deploying Blackness as a lens of interpretation, interrogates the unspoken, assumptive logic of Marxism, postcolonialism, psychoanalysis, and feminism through rigorous theoretical consideration of their properties and assumptive logic, such as their foundations, methods, form, and utility; and it does so, again, on a higher level of abstraction than the discourse and methods of the theories it interrogates.** Again, Afropessimism is, in the main, more of a metatheory than a theory. **It is pessimistic about the claims theories of liberation make when these theories try to explain Black suffering or when they analogize Black suffering with the suffering of other oppressed beings. It does this by unearthing and exposing the meta-aporias, strewn like land mines in what these theories of so-called universal liberation hold to be true.** If, as Afropessimism argues, Blacks are not Human subjects, but are instead structurally inert props, implements for the execution of White and non-Black fantasies and sadomasochistic pleasures, then this also means that, at a higher level of abstraction, the claims of universal humanity that the above theories all subscribe to are ~~hobbled~~ [constricted] by a meta-aporia: a contradiction that manifests whenever one looks seriously at the structure of Black suffering in comparison to the presumed universal structure of all sentient beings. Again, Black people embody a meta-aporia for political thought and action— Black people are the wrench in the works. Blacks do not function as political subjects; instead, our flesh and energies are instrumentalized for postcolonial, immigrant, feminist, LGBTQ, transgender, and workers’ agendas. These so-called **allies are never authorized by Black agendas predicated on Black ethical dilemmas. A Black radical agenda is terrifying to most people on the Left**—think Bernie Sanders—**because it emanates from a condition of suffering for which there is no imaginable strategy for redress—no narrative of social, political, or national redemption**. This crisis, no, this catastrophe, this realization that I am a sentient being who can’t use words like “being” or “person” to describe myself without the scare quotes and the threat of raised eyebrows from anyone within earshot, was crippling. I was convinced that if a story of Palestinian redemption could be told . . . its denouement would culminate in the return of the land, a spatial, cartographic redemption; and if a story of class redemption could be told . . . its denouement would culminate in the restoration of the working day so that one stopped working when surplus values were relegated to the dustbin of history, a temporal redemption; in other words, since postcolonial and working-class redemption were possible, then there must be a story to be told through which one could redeem the time and place of Black subjugation. I was wrong. **I had not dug deep enough to see that though Blacks suffer the time and space subjugation of cartographic deracination and the hydraulics of the capitalist working day, we also suffer as the hosts of Human parasites, though they themselves might be the hosts of parasitic capital and colonialism**. I had looked to theory (first as a creative writer, and only much later as a critical theorist) to help me find/create the story of Black liberation—Black political redemption. What I found instead was that **redemption, as a narrative mode, was a parasite that fed upon me for its coherence. Everything meaningful in my life had been housed under the umbrellas called “critical theory” and “radical politics.”** The parasites had been capital, colonialism, patriarchy, homophobia. And now it was clear that I had missed the boat. My parasites were Humans, all Humans—the haves as well as the have-nots. If critical theory and radical politics are to rid themselves of the parasitism that they heretofore have had in common with radical and progressive movements on the Left, that is, if we are to engage, rather than disavow, **the difference between Humans who suffer through an “economy of disposability” and Blacks who suffer by way of “social death,” then we must come to grips with how the redemption of the subaltern** (a narrative, for example, of Palestinian plenitude, loss, and restoration) **is made possible by the (re)instantiation of a regime of violence that bars Black people from the narrative of redemption**. This requires (a) an understanding of the difference between loss and absence, and (b) an understanding of how the narrative of subaltern loss stands on the rubble of Black absence. Sameer and I didn’t share a universal, postcolonial grammar of suffering. Sameer’s loss is tangible, land. The paradigm of his dispossession elaborates capitalism and the colony. When it is not tangible it is at least coherent, as in the loss of labor power. But how does one describe the loss that makes the world if all that can be said of loss is locked within the world? **How does one narrate the loss of loss? What is the “difference between . . . something to save . . . [and nothing] to lose”?** Sameer forced me to face the depth of my isolation in ways I had wanted to avoid; a deep pit from which neither postcolonial theory, nor Marxism, nor a gender politics of unflinching feminism could rescue me. Why is anti-Black violence not a form of racist hatred but the genome of Human renewal; a therapeutic balm that the Human race needs to know and heal itself? Why must the world reproduce this violence, this social death, so that social life can regenerate Humans and prevent them from suffering the catastrophe of psychic incoherence— absence? Why must the world find its nourishment in Black flesh?

#### Slavery morphs and recodes itself in different ways- it relies on the sadism of liberal progress narratives to perfect itself and maintain “life”. Only the alternative can disrupt this project and render these promises incoherent.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 94-96, JMH]

Northup’s book implies, without stating directly, why this generalization of sadism—brutality as the constituent element of family bonding—cannot be understood as being triggered by transgressions. It is as ubiquitous as the air he breathes. “It was rarely a day passed without more whippings . . . It is the literal, unvarnished truth, that the crack of the lash and the shrieking of slaves, can be heard from dark till bedtime . . .” Patsey and Solomon, unlike Stella and me, were living in a place and time when civil society and the Human were neither ashamed nor embarrassed by this. A thousand miles upriver and one hundred twenty six years later, Josephine was shocked by this inheritance, but it didn’t take her long to recover, and to claim it. Though the structure of Stella’s “life” (or, better, **the paradigm of social death**, for the quotation marks are essential here) **cannot be reconciled with the** structure of Josephine’s life (or **the paradigm of social life**), there is a connection. But **this connection is parasitic and perverse—regardless of what the socially dead Black person (i.e., Stella and Patsey) or the socially alive Human (i.e., Josephine or Mary Epps) might say about their “relationship.”** It is parasitic because White and non-Black subjectivity cannot be imbued with the capacity for selfknowledge and intersubjective community without anti-Black violence; without, that is, the violence of social death. In other words, **White people and their junior partners need anti-Black violence to know they’re alive.\*** If Hattie McDaniel were to truly die, as Stella proclaimed, it would be tantamount to the death of a parasite’s host. This is what makes social death something more surreal than the end of breath. It is, in the words of David Marriott, a deathliness that saturates life, not an embalming; a resource for Human renewal. **It is perverse for many reasons: one of which is the fact that as civil society matures** (from 1853 to December 1979, when it all went south with Josephine)—and we move historically from the obvious technologies of chattel slavery to universal suffrage, the discourse of human rights, and the concept of universal access to civil society— the anti-Black violence necessary for the elaboration and maintenance of White (and non-Black) subjectivity gets repressed and becomes increasingly unavailable to conscious (as opposed to unconscious) speech. (“I judge people by the quality of their character,” as Dr. King said, “and not the color of their skin”; or the commonly spoken, “At the end of the day, we’re all Americans and we’re in this together”— and other such malarkey of the conscious mind.) But the pageantries of naked and submissive Black flesh, pageantries of bleeding backs and buttocks, whip marks, amputations, and faces closed by horse bits, provide evidence of the role sadism plays in the constitution of White subjectivity, and *12 Years a Slave* makes this visible on the screen, despite its repression in the narrative of both the film and civil society writ large. It is tempting and commonplace to reduce Mary and Edwin Epps’s sadism to individual psychopathology. Or one might think that Edwin Epps is one of a group of exceptionally sadistic people who lived in an exceptionally sadistic time and place. But the film, and to an even greater extent the autobiography, sees (rather than narrates) sadism—the sexual perversion in which gratification is obtained by inflicting physical or mental pain on a love object—not as the individual pathology of a handful of people, but as a generalized condition; generalized in that pleasure, as a constituent element of communal life, cannot be disentangled from anti-Black violence. Conventionally, **the object of sadism can**, tomorrow, **become the subject of sadism**. But the sadism that constitutes the spectacles of *12 Years a Slave*, and which constitutes early nineteenth century society, is not imbued with such reciprocity. The Slaves of social death cannot switch places and make Edwin Epps or his equally cruel wife the love objects of their collective sadism. If they did so in private (if Patsey beat Edwin or Mary in a private bedroom encounter, for example) **it is because such a reversal was occasioned and allowed—in other words, the master used his prerogative and power to play a different game, one in which he suffers because suffering fulfills his fantasy and because, unlike the Slave, his fantasies have “objective value.”** Such role reversals do not imbue the encounter with reciprocity. **The changes that begin to occur after the Civil War and up through the Civil Rights Movement, Black Power, and the American election of a Black president are merely changes in the weather. Despite the fact that the sadism is no longer played out in the open as it was in l840, nothing essential has changed.**

#### Anti-black exploitation is a global phenomenon that transcends borders, gender, and class. The fungibility of the slave secures white domination over black flesh as white slave masters are able to manipulate and violate black people anyway imaginable.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 302-305, JMH]

The Black people who worked at Mario’s had little in common politically: Master and DeNight kept their politics to themselves, as did most of South Africa’s thirty-five million Black people when they were at work; this was also true of Sibongile and Liyana. Nicolas and Sipho were IFP members, sworn enemies of the ANC, the South African Communist Party, and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU). Fana, the dishwasher, was a dedicated comrade. All of these differences mattered in important ways. None of them mattered in ways that were essential. We were all positioned in the same place paradigmatically. We were all, in other words, the antithesis of the Human. We were all implements on Mario and Riana’s plantation. **From the Arab slave trade, which began in ad 625, through its European incarnation beginning in 1452, everyone south of the Sahara had to negotiate captivity. At a global level of abstraction we can see how Africa has been carcerally contained by the rest of the world for more than a thousand years. There’s no habeas corpus here. Captivity overdetermined the condition of possibility for everyone’s life.** How people performed on a carceral continent was as varied as the “choices” made by us at Mario’s. Some fled the coast and trekked deeper into the interior to avoid notice and, with any luck, capture—the way DeNight kept to the corners of the restaurant where no one was likely to speak with him when he wasn’t serving his tables. Some made themselves indispensable (for as long as possible) to the White slavers by becoming slave hunters— like Nicolas and Sipho, and impimpis of the Inkatha Freedom Party. Some wore their prowess and pride on their sleeves and lashed out without a plan or foresight—like me. Some confided in the mistress in the hope, perhaps, of attaining some form of sanctuary, or for reasons they themselves could not fathom—like Doreen. **The essential Afropessimist point rests not in a moral judgment of the choices they made, but in an ethical assessment of the common dilemma they all shared—the questions that haunt the slave’s first waking moments: What will these White people do to my flesh today? How deep will they cut?** Some were captured and refused to live. Some sent their children to a different death, as in Beloved. The dreams of all these different captives could not be reconciled, but their place in the paradigm was the same. They woke up each morning with a deeper anxiety than the proletariat, the worker. The proletariat wakes up in the morning wondering, How much will I have to do today and how long will I have to do it? Exploitation and alienation morphed into an early morning ulcer. How much will the capitalist demand of me and how long will I have to do it? Again, the Slave wakes up in the morning wondering, What will these Humans do to my flesh? A hydraulics of anxiety that is very different than exploitation and alienation. If a can of tuna or a bucket of nails could speak, their essential questions would not revolve around how their labor power is being exploited, or how they are alienated from the value that they produce. Exploitation and alienation are not the grammar of their suffering. (How can one exploit an implement?) And the value that a tool helps produce never accrues to the tool. **For the Slave, the implement, exploitation and alienation are trumped by accumulation and fungibility. Slaves themselves are consumed, not their labor power. Slaves are implements, not workers. What Marx called “speaking implements”:** Mario and Riana’s speaking implements. Our response to captivity was as varied as the myriad choices that our ancestors made hundreds of years ago on that continent. But the question was the same: What will these White people do to my flesh? And the answer is the same: Anything they want. **There is no habeas corpus here,** Rebone warned. She didn’t know how right she was: for Black people there is no habeas corpus anywhere. Doreen knew this better than any of us. She negotiated her captivity by fainting: her unconscious attempt to save herself by throwing herself overboard. When she came to, she was staring up into the faces of all her masters, and me, a fellow slave. Freelance pallbearers took her body to the ambulance. She would live, when what she really may have wanted was to follow death into freedom; to jump ship before it docked. Who wouldn’t tell them what they wanted to hear? There’s no habeas corpus here. Doreen and the rest of us lived (if lived is the word) in a paradigm of violence that bore no analogy to the violence of exploitation and alienation suffered by the worker. Doreen was the first Black person specifically hired, and officially sanctioned, to handle money with her Black hands. White South Africans had hired her to break their libidinal laws—to violate the mainstays of their collective unconscious. Then some trickster in the alcove whispers in her ear what her intuition had not let her think out loud: that it was all a setup. **The Black people who worked at Mario’s were different ages, ethnicities, and genders. But these differences at the level of identity did not alter our sameness at the level of position. One does not position oneself in the world; one is born into a name that’s been chosen. Perhaps there was a moment of solidarity sparked by a common acknowledgment of our common position within social death.** If there was such a moment, it was splintered: The stern way Master schooled me in the locker room and the flickers of kindness he showed in the tensest situations, gestures that put his wife and his children in Venda, to whom he sent money each month, at risk. The way Nicolas and Sipho did not hurt me, or worse, when they had the chance; a deed for which they would have been exonerated and rewarded.

#### Only through embracement of disorder and incoherence via the alternative are we able create revolutionary politics that disrupt the generative mechanism of civil society.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 249-252, JMH]

Again, though this is a bond between Blacks and Whites (or, more precisely, between Black and non-Blacks), it is produced by a violent intrusion that does not cut both ways. Whereas the phobic bond is an injunction against Black psychic integration and Black filial and affilial relations, it is the lifeblood of White psychic integration and filial (which is to say, domestic) and affilial (or institutional) relations. For whoever says “rape” says Black; whoever says “prison” says Black; and whoever says “AIDS” says Black—the Negro is a phobogenic object: a past without a heritage, the map of gratuitous violence, and a program of complete disorder. If a social movement is to be neither social democratic nor Marxist, in terms of its structure of political desire, then it should grasp the invitation of social death embodied in Black beings. **If we are to be honest with ourselves, we must admit that the “~~Negro~~” “Black” has been inviting Whites, as well as civil society’s junior partners** (for example, Palestinians, Native Americans, Latinx) **to the dance of social death for hundreds of years, but few have wanted to learn the steps.** They have been, and remain today (even in the most anti-racist movements, like anti-colonial insurgency) invested elsewhere. Black liberation, as a prospect, makes radicalism more dangerous to the U.S. and the world. **This is not because it raises the specter of an alternative polity (such as socialism, or community control of existing resources), but because its condition of possibility and gesture of resistance function as a politics of refusal and a refusal to affirm, a program of complete disorder. One must embrace its disorder, its incoherence, and allow oneself to be elaborated by it, if indeed one’s politics are to be underwritten by a revolutionary desire.** What other lines of accountability are there when slaves are in the room? There is nothing foreign, frightening, or even unpracticed about the embrace of disorder and incoherence. The desire to be embraced, and elaborated, by disorder and incoherence is not anathema in and of itself. No one, for example, has ever been known to say, Gee whiz, if only my orgasms would end a little sooner, or maybe not come at all. Few so-called radicals desire to be embraced, and elaborated, by the disorder and incoherence of Blackness—and the state of political movements in the U.S. today is marked by this very Negrophobogenisis: Gee-whiz, if only Black rage could be more coherent, or maybe not come at all. Perhaps there is something more terrifying about the joy of Black than there is in the joy of sex (unless one is talking sex with a Negro). Perhaps coalitions today prefer to remain inorgasmic in the face of civil society—with hegemony as a handy prophylactic, just in case. If, **through this stasis or paralysis, they try to do the work of prison abolition, that work will fail, for it is always work from a position of coherence (such as the worker) on behalf of a position of incoherence of the Black: radical politics morphed into extensions of the master’s prerogative.** In this way, **social formations on the Left remain blind to the contradictions of coalitions between Humans and Slaves. They remain coalitions operating within the logic of civil society and function less as revolutionary promises than as crowding-out scenarios of Black antagonisms, simply feeding Black people’s frustration.** Whereas the positionality of the worker (whether a factory worker demanding a monetary wage, an immigrant, or a white woman demanding a social wage) gestures toward the reconfiguration of civil society, the positionality of the Black subject (whether a prison-slave or a prison-slave-in-waiting) gestures toward the disconfiguration of civil society. From the coherence of civil society, the Black subject beckons with the incoherence of civil war, a war that reclaims Blackness not as a positive value, but as a politically enabling site, to quote Fanon, of “absolute dereliction.” It is a “scandal” that rends civil society asunder. Civil war, then, becomes the unthought, but never forgotten, understudy of hegemony. It is a Black specter waiting in the wings, an endless antagonism that cannot be satisfied (via reform or reparation), but must nonetheless be pursued to the death. But lest we forget, this is not a question of volition. It is not as simple as waking up in the morning and deciding, in one’s conscious mind, to “do the right thing.” **For when we scale up from the terrain of the psyche to the terrain of armed struggle, we may be faced with a situation in which the eradication of the generative mechanism of Black suffering is something that is not in anyone’s interest.** Eradication of the generative mechanisms of Black suffering is not in the interest of Palestinians and Israelis, as my shocking encounter with my friend Sameer, on a placid hillside, suggests; because his anti-Black phobia mobilizes the fantasy of belonging that the Israeli state might otherwise strip him of. For him to secure his status as a relational being (if only in his unconscious), his unconscious must labor to maintain the Black as a genealogical isolate. “The shame and humiliation runs even deeper if the Israeli soldier was an Ethiopian Jew.” The Israelis are killing the Palestinians, literally; but psychic life, Human capacity for relations, is vouchsafed by a libidinal relay between them and their common labor to avoid ~~“niggerization”~~ [~~negroization~~] [racialization]  
(Fanon). **This relay is the generative mechanism that makes life life. It is also the generative mechanism of Black suffering and isolation. The end of this generative mechanism would mean the end of the world. We would find ourselves peering into the abyss.** This trajectory is too iconoclastic for working-class, post-colonial, and/or radical feminist conceptual frameworks. The Human need to be liberated in the world is not the same as the Black need to be liberated from the world; which is why even their most radical cognitive maps draw borders between the living and the dead. Finally**, if we push this analysis to the wall, it becomes clear that eradication of the generative mechanisms of Black suffering is also not in the interests of Black revolutionaries. For how can we disimbricate Black juridical and political desire from the Black psyche’s desire to destroy the Black imago, a desire that constitutes the psyche?** In short, bonding with Whites and non-Blacks over phobic reactions to the Black imago provides the Black psyche with the only semblance of psychic integration it is likely to have: the need to destroy a Black imago and love a White ideal. “In these circumstances, having a ‘white’ unconscious may be the only way to connect with—or even contain—the overwhelming and irreparable sense of loss. The intruding fantasy offers the medium to connect with the lost internal object, the ego, but there is also no ‘outside’ to this ‘real fantasy’ and the effects of intrusion are irreparable.” This raises the question, who is the speaking subject of Black insurgent testimony; who bears witness when the Black insurgent takes the stand? Who is writing this book?

#### Debate as a game is foundationally built of death and the recreation of narratives of black death. These attempts at story telling seek to make violence more legible in an attempt to find a conclusion to their story. Instead, every spectacle created within debate only feeds white Jouissance as debaters gain pleasure in playing the game and envisioning death with no reprieve.

Wilderson 20 [Frank B. Wilderson, professor of Drama and African American studies at the University of California, Irvine, “Afropessimism”, page 91-93, JMH]

If one asked Mary Epps why she bashed Patsey’s eye with a whiskey decanter or why she goaded Edwin Epps into whipping Patsey within an inch of her life, as he eventually does, even she would try to find a reason—Patsey seduced my husband—which would fall apart the moment it was brought to her attention that Patsey lived without consent, without, that is, the right to accept or deny Edwin and Mary access to her body. **As a slave Patsey has no right to sanctuary, sexual or otherwise.** The film tries to anchor the whippings that a Black woman receives in the rational explanations of jealousy and transgression. In other words, the narrative asks us to believe that the principal reason for so much mutilation of the flesh is contingent upon some inappropriate act, a transgression that can be named. We are told Mary Epps, the wife of a ruthless plantation owner, wants Patsey, a beautiful (of course, only the “beautiful” ones are wanted) and productive slave, beaten and sold because her husband creeps down from the mansion at night to rape Patsey (an act he, no doubt, sees as more amorous than violent). We are told that Solomon’s back is opened with a paddle and a whip because he could not be disciplined or because he (and other slaves) did not pick his quota of cotton for the day. Jealousy and transgression put the audience at ease, release them from the horror of having to think of this violence as pleasure without purpose—like an act of love or a song in the heart or skipping down the street when no one is looking, all the things that sustain Human life but don’t appear on the ledger. **What if anti-Black violence could be counted among the things that make life life, without registering as profit or loss?** What if jealousy and transgression are ruses, disguises that the real reasons for the violence hide behind? **If no contingency triggers this violence, how can it fit in a story? How do we make sense of a prelogical phenomenon like anti-Black violence? “I am in my pleasure.”** In other words, the whippings are a life force: like a song, or good sex without a procreative aim. **“Jouissance”** is the word that comes to mind. **A French word that means enjoyment, in terms both of rights and property, and of sexual orgasm.** (The latter has a meaning partially lacking in the English word “enjoyment.”) **Jouissance compels the subject to constantly attempt to transgress the prohibitions imposed on his or her enjoyment, to go beyond the pleasure principle. Jouissance is an anchor tenant of psychoanalysis.** But until the work of the critical theorists David Marriott, Jared Sexton, and Saidiya Hartman—that is to say, prior to an Afropessimist hijacking of psychoanalysis—devotees of Lacan and Freud had not made the link between jouissance and the regime of violence known as social death. This juxtaposition, unfortunately, takes place at a level of abstraction that is too high for narrative and the logic of storytelling. Unlike violence against the working class, which secures an economic order, or violence against non-Black women, which secures a patriarchal order, or violence against Native Americans, which secures a colonial order, **the jouissance that constitutes the violence of anti-Blackness secures the order of life itself; sadism in service to the prolongation of life. One thing that makes this sadism life-affirming and communal** (as opposed to destructive and individual**) is the fact that it is a family affair**. In his book, Solomon Northup recalls episodes of Patsey’s beat- ings with details that are crucial and missing from the film. “Mistress [Mary] Epps,” he writes, “stood on the piazza among her children gazing on the scene with an air of heartless satisfaction.” The scene that Solomon Northup paints of Mary Epps standing on the piazza brings to mind the musings of Mary Boykin Chesnut, the most cited chronicler of the American Civil War, who wrote, “Our men live all in one house with their wives and their concubines, and the mulattoes one sees in every family exactly resemble the white children . . . All the time they seem to think themselves patterns, models of husbands and fathers.” In the realm of the conscious mind, Mary Chesnut is as incensed by the licentious satisfaction White male slaveholders extract from Black women as Mary Epps is (in her conscious mind, as well). But Solomon Northup’s psychoanalytic labor indexes how, in the realm of the unconscious mind, this “heartless satisfaction” is the currency of men like Edwin Epps and their wives; despite the fact that only the former can secure his satisfaction in the open. **The point to be made is that this satisfaction is shared even if its expression is not.** Like her husband, Mary Epps is “in [her] pleasure”; and she is also with her children, who are in their pleasure as well. This generalization of satisfaction and pleasure, subtended by gratuitous violence against Black flesh, fans out from conventional sadism between sexual partners to a family gathering of adults and children of all ages, like the Eppses’ son, a boy of ten or twelve who rides his pony out to the cotton fields and “without discrimination . . . applies the raw hide, urging slaves forward with shouts and occasional profanity.” We would be wrong to think that the boy’s “urging slaves forward” lends purpose and legibility to the violence—it does not. Like any other child, the boy is at play. He is in his pleasure. Each time he rides his little pony to the fields, he compels an old man named Uncle Abram to be his cheering squad, his chorus, to “laugh . . . and commend him for being a thorough-going boy.”

## Case

### 1NC – Economy

#### Whiteness is an existential threat— (let’s just do the extinction debate here)

Preston, 17—Cass School of Education and Communities, University of East London (John, “Rethinking Existential Threats and Education,” Competence Based Education and Training (CBET) and the End of Human Learning pp 61-93, dml)

After Marxism, the second existential threat is one of negation and elimination of the subject and here I shall consider conceptions of this from CRT and black existentialism.

Various contemporary educational theories consider the equity and social justice implications of different forms of education with regard to race. The work of Sleeter and Grant (2007) makes the ethical and pragmatic case for multicultural social justice as a key value of education. This has been followed in contemporary work that attempts to consider the various dimensions of social justice. For example, Bhopal and Shain (2014), consider the twin axis of recognition and redistribution as goals of education. Other work examines the role of social distancing from the ‘Other’ by white students as a dynamic process in which Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic (BAME) and working-class students are disadvantaged. In many ways denial of social justice in terms of lack of resources, recognition or access to social space can be considered to be a form of dehumanisation. However, whilst work on social justice and education might consider the lack of humanity in these systems of oppression (applying concepts such as ‘bare life’, Lewis 2006; or ‘othering’ Lebowitz 2016) they do not consider directly existential threats. Threats to humanity on the basis of difference may arise from totalitarianism as much as through war and threats to the environment. The various genocides which have taken place throughout human history have often had a racial, or ethnic, cleansing purpose to them. They have been eugenic threats that are based upon spurious ideas of genetic and moral superiority. Writers on race from Fanon to Du Bois have considered that the threat posed to racial groups may be existential and that there is a short step from psychic, to real extermination. The negation of individuals through economic, social and psychological processes allows for their physical extermination. Du Bois (2014) deals explicitly with existential threat in his short story ‘The Comet’ where humanity is almost wiped out by a threat from space, leaving only a small number of people to carry on. As one of the survivors of the comet is an African American, this leads Du Bois to consider the state of race relations in the USA. The implication of the story is that the existential threat of the comet (which allows the African American character to live in a world entirely free of racial prejudice) allows release from the existential threat of eugenic attitudes. Building on Du Bois, in other work (Preston 2012), I have considered the ways in which preparation for threats, including existential threats such as pandemics and nuclear war, has been in many ways eugenic in that it prioritises the survival of some more than others based upon criteria which include race and ethnicity (Preston 2012). Preparing for disasters and emergencies often prioritises the interests of white people above those of other ethnic minorities. One reason for this is tacit intentionality which means that policymakers and practitioners do not consider human diversity in considering how people may respond to disaster. Policy is often biased as policymakers expect that people will be ‘like me’ which (at least in the UK and USA) means they will often be white, middle-class, educated, English-speaking men. In planning for threats, there will be various ways in which such biases are included. For example, they may not consider publishing advice in a number of languages, the resources necessary to survive a disaster, the mobility of people and the attitudes of emergency responders. This is unwitting prejudice in that by not considering diversity they are actually making it less likely for BAME people to survive, or protect themselves against, the disaster.

Although these biases may lead to a gradient in terms of survival by different groups in a disaster, they do not appear to relate to existential threat. However, existential threat can be interpreted in a different way in perspectives from critical whiteness studies and CRT.

In critical whiteness studies, whiteness is taken to be not a racial identity, but rather a system of power and oppression (Leonardo 2009). Whiteness was created as an identity not simply as a mode of social classification but as a way of exploiting and controlling others. There are obviously periods in history where this was objectively the case. During slavery in the USA, for example, whiteness was used as a means to distinguish between those people who had the right to own property (whites) and those who could not (Africans), Moreover, whiteness was the obverse of property in that only Africans could ‘be’ assets or property. Enslaved Africans were therefore treated as property and did not have access to the basic rights which would constitute humanity in American society (such as access to education, the right to own property, the right to decide who they should have relationships with). There are obviously parallels between this experience and holocaust when Jewish people (and other individuals) were dehumanised by the Nazis and denied access to basic resources. During imperialism there was also a period whereby other races were categorised to be less worthy than white people and this provided the justification for colonial control, exploitation and often extermination.

Advocates of whiteness studies go further than this and consider that whiteness is not merely a past system of oppression, but a continuing system of white supremacy (Leonardo 2009). The economy and society is comprised in such a way that white people will usually benefit, and BAME people will usually not. This is not only an economic and social system but also a psychological system whereby existence as a full human depends upon one’s racial categorisation. This idea has its roots in the work of Fanon (1986) who wrote that black identity was shaped by the white gaze, but also contemporary writers also consider the notion of whiteness as ‘death’, a categorisation that is rooted in past oppression and extermination, whose remnants exist to this day. This perspective on race and existence leads us to consider what is meant by life, and whether we are not currently living to our full potential (as Marxists would also propose) when existential threat is actually amongst us. For Marxists this would be the expansion of the ‘social universe’ of capitalism that flows between and through us, ‘capitalising humanity’. For critical whiteness studies, this existential threat would be one of whiteness and the negation of existence for a racially classified group of people.

In order to make this idea of constant existential threat more tangible (although the term is not used) critical race theorists use what are known as ‘counter-stories’ to consider how racial dynamics might develop in the future, or to highlight inequalities in the present (Delgado 1996). Derrick Bell (1992) who is considered to be the founder of CRT, uses a much cited counter-story ‘The Space Traders’ to consider the ways in which black people’s lives are classed as being not equal to those of whites in the USA. In ‘The Space Traders’ a race of aliens offer the USA a trade: all of America’s black citizens in return for unlimited, environmentally friendly, energy and technology. After some debate, the American people vote on the proposal and decide to give up all of America’s black citizens to the space traders in return for the futuristic technical goods. Of course, Bell is proposing an analogy between slavery in the past and the present situation of black people in the USA, and perhaps even suggesting that such a thing might happen again. On another level, though, there is also the idea that the existence of black people in America is categorised at a different level of metaphysical worth to that of white people. That life could be traded so cheaply, even plausibly (in the thought experiment) makes us pause for thought in terms of how we classify existential threat.

Although the relationship between CRT and black existentialism may not always seem obvious we can see that there is a nihilistic streak in the work of Bell (1992) with regard to the prospects for survival. In addition, the drawing on the work of Fanon by authors who use CRT as part of their work which shows the perpetual violence encountered by people of colour in education as well as the enduring influence of Du Bois on CRT (Delgado and Stefancic 2001) shows the close connection between the two theories. What links CRT and black existentialism is a basic concern with existence and the meaning of human life under constant threat that can be thought to underpin any concern with social justice. From CRT and black existentialism, we therefore see that existential threat is one of negation through economic, social and political systems and there are degrees of graduation between these forms of existential threats and actual genocide or extermination. The links between these points and CBET might be considered as obtuse but, as we shall see in the next chapter, systems of education can play a role in forms of negation. Obviously, there are social justice implications in the way in which people are treated in terms of race and ethnicity in education. The ‘triaging’ by race and ethnicity of access to education courses, the ways in which certain groups are rationed access to educational routes and the fragility of links between education and the labour market for BAME groups are all part of marginalisation, in which vocational education plays a large part. As part of this process, and probably not coincidentally, these groups are also more likely to find themselves in vocational, CBET courses. However, social justice is not the whole story, and there is a more profound form of equality associated with the right to existence. It is this that CBET threatens through the reduction of the subject to a digital organism as I will show in the next chapter.

**Embracing extinction as a narrative—not biological—phenomenon is a prerequisite to disrupting white desires**

**Schotten, 18**—Associate Professor of Political Science and an affiliated faculty in Women's and Gender Studies, University of Massachusetts-Boston (C. Heike, “SOCIETY MUST BE DESTROYED,” *Queer Terror: Life, Death, and Desire in the Settler Colony* pg 108-111, dml)

How, then, to articulate and effect the radical abolitionism of revolutionary desire without getting caught up in the stranglehold of futurism? Futurism’s inescapability means **not simply that politics is irredeemable** and **reform insufficient**, but also that the deconstructive or queer practice of **subversive redeployment** is a **naïve delusion** regarding our own ability to **think** and **act outside** or **beyond futurist mandates**. As Edelman simultaneously argues and demonstrates, futurism’s **stifling determination** of the very domain of the political itself means that **any** and **all resistance is always already coopted**, while revolt is an impossibly queered space that is simultaneously named and foreclosed by the death drive. Yet Edelman’s solution to this dilemma is to recommend neither **capitulation** to futurism nor some sort of **compromise** with it but rather an **accession to its worst nightmares** in an embrace of queerness that will **destroy it from within**, “shortcircuit[ing] the social in its present form.”74 In other words, rather than **defend** society, which Edelman finds indefensible, much less **deconstruct** society, as a queer critique of norms might recommend, or even (dear me!) **redeem** society, by **entreating a utopian vision** that imagines the overcoming of all suffering and oppression, Edelman instead declares we must **destroy society**. And we do so by **taking up**, **inhabiting**, or “**embracing**” the very “**death**” that futurism **inevitably produces** as the queer by- product of its social ordering. He thus **dismisses utopianism** in the name of an **immediacy** that “**the future stop here**,”75 challenging us to live life as an **insistent presentism** that will **do nothing else afterward but die**, and casting this alliance with death as the **act of revolutionary resistance**.

While Dean vociferously rejects this “embrace” because of its psychoanalytic impossibility, Edelman, I think, is well aware of this fact and recommends it precisely for this reason, a contradiction that becomes more intelligible if understood politically rather than solely psychoanalytically. Indeed, Edelman’s recommendation of this “embrace” is a clearly political position— despite what he may say otherwise— in two specific, complex ways. First, recall the historicization of Edelman’s argument provided in chapter 2, wherein I characterized his version of “politics” as a distinctly modern, European, settler colonial sovereignty. An important consequence of this historicization is that, even in his allegedly non- or antipolitical advocacy, Edelman **cannot actually be rejecting politics per se** since, despite his own claims to the contrary, there is **no such thing**. Abolishing modern politics or futurist politics is **not equivalent to abolishing politics as such** and could only mean as much if **every modernity were European modernity**, if **every politics were a sovereign biopolitics**, and if **every temporality were futurist**. To understand Edelman’s refusal of politics as a **refusal of any and all politics existing anywhere** is to **go along with** his unmarked **universalist presentation of** reproductive **futurism** as the **logic of everything existing everywhere all the time**, itself a frequent conceit of psychoanalytic frames.76 But if futurism is the **temporality of modern biopolitical sovereignty**, it **immediately becomes clear that other temporalities are possible**, even as other versions of politics **must necessarily exist**.77 As Audra Simpson argues, for example, “Indigenous political orders are quite simply, first, . . . **prior** to the project of founding, of settling, and as such **continue to point**, in their persistence and vigor, to the **failure of the settler project to eliminate them**, and yet are subjects of dispossession, of removal, but their polities serve as **alternative forms of legitimacy** and **sovereignties** to that of the settler state.”78

Historicizing futurist politics in this way means that alternative temporalities or political schemas **exist** but are queer(ed) and **represented as existential threats** to it: as **unintelligible**, **unlivable**, **immoral**, **backward**, and “**savage**.” While Edelman does indeed conflate all politics with futurism, such that his call for the destruction of politics seems to portend an unthinkable and intolerable nihilism, it is nevertheless the case that, once situated historically, the advocacy that queers **accede to the deathly positioning** to which they are always already relegated by reproductive futurism is **not some sort of unthinkable**, **antipolitical vision**, nor is it an **advocacy of suicide** or **some sort of necropolitical imperative**. Rather, in the context of a **European modernity** built on the colonization of most of the rest of the world, Edelman’s embrace of death can be read as a **prescription** for an **anticolonial allegiance to** and **alliance with those forms of politics** and **temporality that thwart**, **refuse**, or **deny futurism’s colonial mandates**. No Future’s embrace of the “death drive,” in other words, is a **championing of resistant futures** and **political systems** that **show up as death from a futurist perspective** and are various surrogates for the broad, structural category he designates as “queer.” In advocating for a revolution on behalf of queers and arguing for an embrace of queerness, then, Edelman is very much arguing in the name of something— not the future, of course, and certainly not life in any biological sense. But he is also **not quite arguing in the name of death in a biological sense**, either. Rather, he is arguing that “the dead” should “live,” that is, that they “come to life” (or insistently exist) and **animate the destruction of the settler order** that they are always already **consigned by that social order to symbolize**. This is, in other words, an argument for indigenous existence as resistance to settler sovereignty. Siting and situating futurism historically make clear that Edelman’s recommended accession to queerness/death is another name for radical resistance to sovereign biopolitics and that, **far from nihilism**, it is an **emancipatory** and **decolonizing political recommendation** of the first order. In this sense, even Edelman’s own project is wedded to life, albeit a life that is unlivable as life, which is the status of native life within settler colonial regimes. As he says in recommendation of embracing the death drive, “political self- destruction inheres in the only act that counts as one: the act of resisting enslavement to the future in the name of having a life.”79 Edelman’s opposition to the political can therefore be reread as a **wholesale opposition** to the sovereign biopolitics of European modernity and an **imagining of the death of that political order** as the **content of revolutionary politics**. Indeed, his suggestion of a necessary “counterproject”80 to futurism makes clear that his recommendation of this refusal is the **essential**, **necessary**, and **definitive act of political resistance**, even as it is a **championing of the lives** and **political temporalities** of those **determined to be emissaries of death**.

Importantly, this destructive refusal is a threat that redounds back on Edelman himself and on **all of us who share** his **habitation of futurist politics** in Western modernity (or who were ourselves **trained in the history of that thought**). This is the second, complex way that Edelman’s rejection of politics is in fact a **maximally political entreaty**. The tension at work in Edelman’s inevitably futurist call to end futurism means that he is also and necessarily calling for the destruction of his own revolutionary project and subjective/authorial position. This is a queer revolution that **queers the aims of revolution itself**, divesting itself of futurism even as it speaks in its name. As a political act, it amounts “to **put[ting] one’s foot down at last**, **even if doing so costs us the ground on which we**, **like all others**, **must stand**.”81 It is a revolutionary desire that seeks to dispossess revolution of its failed foundations without thereby relinquishing either revolution or its animating desire. This revolutionary discourse exceeds the parameters of revolution as it has hitherto unfolded in modernity, even as it promises a liberation from modernity’s— and liberation’s— moralizing constraints.

This paradoxical, queer(ed) revolution is therefore **unmistakably tied to death**, and in more than one way: not only because queerness is the structural position of anything antisociety and antilife; not only because it **demands the destruction of all that has been construed as life** (as **valuable life**, as **worthy life**, as life **worth living** and **endowed with a future**); but also because the revolutionary call to destroy society and its futurist temporality will **necessarily result in the eradication of its own revolutionary demand in the process**. This is why Edelman’s queer political project **can never recommit us to sovereignty**, whether of a charismatic revolutionary leader, a vanguard revolutionary class, or a theological vision of an allpowerful monarch, much less the **sovereign subject**, whose **very European coherence requires futurism’s linear temporality**. It can commit us **only to the destruction of these things**, as well as to the **eradication of our own commitments precisely to that very destruction** if, as, and when they **threaten to become the next crushing futurist ideal**. Edelman’s formulation of the **impossible** yet **wholly revolutionary goal** of refusing futurism— a refusal achievable only in a future that lies beyond its textual articulation and summary rejection there— offers a **rich** and **provocative articulation** of a revolutionary desire that seeks to **dispossess revolution of its very foundations**, even as it speaks in its name.

#### The presumption that markets can be post-racial as a matter of inclusion is an attempt to efface history and rescue race from blackness, located as absent relationality or agency.

Dumas 13 (Michael J., Assistant Professor at the University of California, Berkeley in the Graduate School of Education and the African American Studies Department, “’Waiting for Superman’ to save black people: racial representation and the official antiracism of neoliberal school reform,” Discourse: Studies in the Cultural Politics of Education, 34:4, 2013)

The rise of neoliberalism in the 1980s and 1990s shifted the relationship between governmentality and race; while in earlier periods, the state positioned itself as the leader in advancing antiracism, under neoliberal multiculturalism , it is neoliberal economic policies and ideological formations that are seen to resolve the problem of racism. The market, in this hegemonic frame, knows neither race nor racism, and is therefore regarded as best suited to facilitate racial equality. Neoliberal multiculturalism promises to usher in the post-racial period, by nurturing a new global citizenship centered around economic participation. ‘ In short ’ , Melamed contends, ‘neoliberal multiculturalism has portrayed an ethic of multiculturalism to be the spirit of neoliberalism ’ (p. 42). In doing so, neoliberal multiculturalism abandons any explicit mention of race. While liberal multiculturalism employed discourses of equity, diversity and freedom, ‘ now open societies and economic freedoms ... and consumerist diversity signify multicultural rights for individuals and for corporations ’ (p. 43; italics in original). Neoliberal multiculturalism is still attentive to racial difference and recognizes inequitable outcomes, but explains these differences as essentially not about race or (in) justice, but individual and group choices. As Melamed explains: Neoliberal-multicultural racialization has made this disparity appear fair by ascribing racialized privilege to neoliberalism ’ s beneficiaries and racialized stigma to its dispossessed. In particular, it has valued its beneficiaries as multicultural, reasonable, law-abiding, and good global citizens and devalued the dispossessed as monocultural, backward, weak, and irrational – unfit for global citizenship because they lack the proper neoliberal subjectivity. ( 2009 , p. 44) In contrast to black stigmatization under liberal multiculturalism, here the focus is on the distance between black subjects and the market. Through the neoliberal-multicultural lens, we can still feel sympathy to the extent that these subjects are perceived as being prevented from participating in the market. However, if they reject opportunities to participate in the market, no matter how rigged that system may be, then our sympathies can be justifiably withheld. Any argument that the economic sphere is already regulated by racial privilege will fall on deaf ears, as the market is already presumed to be multicultural and racially ethical (i.e. post -racial) on its face. I want to suggest that, even in a neoliberal-multicultural period, we can still identify elements of racial liberalism and liberal multiculturalism. History is never erased or transcended; dimensions of the previous periods are evident in our national-racial imagination and in the racial representations that inform and are informed by that imagination. Waiting for Superman as a cultural and political product Near the beginning of Waiting for Superman (Guggenheim, 2010 ), Harlem Children ’ s Zone founder and so-called education ‘ reformer ’ , Geoffrey Canada, recalls his childhood disappointment in learning that Superman is not real. ‘ Even in the depth of the ghetto ’ ,he explains to the off-camera interviewer, ‘ you thought, he ’ s coming. I just don ’ t know when, because he always shows up and he saves all the good people ’ . As he speaks, images of a young Canada fade to black, interspersed with images of George Reeves as the hero in tights in the 1950s TV series, Adventures of Superman : I asked my mom, do you think Superman is – she said, Superman is not real ... and I said, what do you mean, he ’ s not real? And she thought I was crying because it ’ s like, Santa Claus is not real, and I was crying because there was no one coming with enough power to save us. In inspiring the title of the controversial documentary, Canada presents an image of a poor urban black community without a sense of hope, innocent but helpless in the face of social, economic and spatial marginalization. A people in need of a savior, the young black boy reckons, would do well to appeal for help to the ultimate all-American (white) superhero. Here, his city neighborhood becomes constructed as an uninhabitable jungle (Leonardo & Hunter, 2007 ). Unlike in some rightist interpretations, the black residents of Canada ’ s ghetto are not to blame for their condition, but instead are victims of something unnamed, a tragic historical accident. Blameless, they earn our sympathies; however, they clearly do not have enough agencies to help themselves. Or as Canada suggests, poor African Americans are so far gone, their salvation may require someone with superhuman powers. The producers of Waiting for Superman use Canada ’ s childhood memory to frame the film ’ s heartbreaking, liberal racial narrative, in which racial inequities are bemoaned without any acknowledgment of racism, (good) people of color eschew collectivist racial politics, and black subjects in particular are quick to point out their own personal moral and emotional failures as the cause of their own low educational aspirations and attainment. Waiting for Superman is significant as a cultural and political product, because it has been largely embraced by corporate education reformers like wealthy philanthropists Bill Gates and Eli Broad, and because of its harsh critique of teacher unions and uncritical praise for private educational-entrepreneurial ventures like KIPP and Teach for America. Although the film generated a massive critical response from academics and progressive education advocates (see, for example, http://www.notwaitingforsuperman.org ), it enjoyed a generally sympathetic and often enthusiastic response everywhere else, from glowing newspaper and magazine stories, to favorable coverage by influential media personalities like Oprah Winfrey and Katie Couric. Waiting for Superman is also important, because it is perhaps the most influential popular-discursive effort to advance a new managerialism in education reform. Manage- rialism, as Michael Apple ( 2006 ) explains is led by an emerging group of middle-class professionals committed to using business models of profit, competition and efficiency to ‘ reform ’ education (and other public institutions and functions). This entails privatizing some schools, and financially and politically undermining remaining public institutions, which are then forced to compete with these marketized schools. Ultimately, then, the argument can be made that private entities can more effectively deliver services that have previously been understood as public, as part of our collective responsibility for the public good. Managerialism is ‘ an ideal project ’ , Apple contends, ‘ merging the language of empowerment, rational choice, efficient organization, and new roles for managers all at the same time ’ (p. 25). Waiting for Superman is, in effect, a managerialist manifesto for education in the United States. What we learn in examining racial representations in the film is exactly how mangerialism aims to win for the rightist project a certain innocence vis à vis racism, and more, a sense that racial progress depends on adopting conservative ideology and reform policies. The story arc of Waiting for Superman , its primary suspense, centers on a competitive public lottery system in which children and their families vie for a severely limited number of student spots in highly-regarded charter schools. It is The Hunger Games in reverse; here, those not selected are presumed to be the unfortunate ones, condemned to suffering and abuse, while the masses watch. And like that blockbuster motion picture, Waiting for Superman is a cultural product, not simply a documentation of truth, or policy, or everyday life. The filmmakers construct a dramatic plot, with messages embedded in the images and also made explicit in the text. We meet the families, hear them share their struggles and dreams, and explain what they believe accounts for their own educational and/or social marginality. The filmmakers intend to evoke enough sympathy that as the film comes to its dramatic final scenes, we are emotionally invested in the outcome, anxious to discover if the students will be offered admission, as the number of still available seats becomes smaller and smaller. In most cases, the families experience crushing disappointment, which allows opportunities for wrenching close-ups of terrified eyes, tear-stained cheeks, and hands still clenching strips of paper with losing numbers. To a great degree, the filmmakers need, perhaps the audience too needs, or at least desires, to see suffering. Not only does it help the filmmakers make their argument about the state of public education, but it is also better theater, more compelling entertainment. Ultimately, our own humanity is affirmed, because we care so much about these strangers on the screen. In one particularly moving scene, we see a Latina mother, Maria, touring a Harlem charter school where she hopes her first-grade son, Francisco, will win a spot, to escape his low-resourced school in the South Bronx. Maria is clearly impressed with the resources of the charter school, and looks longingly at the warm, inviting classrooms. ‘ I don ’ t care if we have to wake up at 5 o ’ clock in the morning in order to get there at 7:45 ’ , she says, almost plaintively. ‘ That ’ s what we will do ’ . But, as the New York Times later reported (Otterman, 2010 ), when this scene was filmed, Maria already knew that Francisco would not get to attend this school. The scene was staged after the lottery, in order to ‘ see her reaction to the school, and her genuine emotion ’ , according to director Davis Guggenheim. For him, the scene was ‘ real ’ because the pain and longing in her eyes revealed her excitement about the possibility of having her son attend the charter school, although it might also be argued that they exploited her pain for their own purposes. It is certainly not uncommon for documentary filmmakers to re-enact and re-order scenes; my point here is to underscore that Waiting for Superman is produced , and produced in ways which evoke not only specific emotions, but produce and reproduce certain cultural discourses and ideological formations. As a racial cultural product, the film provides images of racialized bodies and differences that seem natural largely because they draw upon the familiar or the popular, that which we already accept about race, and more specifically here, blackness. As Herman Gray ( 2005 ) explains, ‘ the movement of black images and representation is never free of cultural and social traces of the condition of their production, circulation, and use ’ (p. 21). Hence, what I want to highlight in my analysis of the film is the ways in which black social actors take their (expected) place within the broader ideological conditions of official antiracisms – speaking, gazing and even moving on screen in support of that grander narrative. As I have hinted, if not said explicitly thus far, neoliberal multiculturalism, in conjunction with managerialism, brings an inherent effort to move beyond the black- white racial paradigm. This is more than an acknowledgment of a fuller plane of racial diversity, but an ideological position in which ‘ black ’ is understood as anachronistic, passé and a threat to national progress. Jared Sexton ( 2008 ) is worth quoting at length: Modernizing the nation – at least the segment of the nation with the potential to be ‘ more than black ’ or simply to move ‘ beyond black ’– and liberating it from the deadening weight of the past requires that the signature of its persistence ... be effaced. In this light, multiracialism can be read ... as an element of the ascendant ideology of colorblindness, but it is not thereby identical to it. Its target is not race per se, since multiracialism is still very much a politics of racial identity ... but rather the categorical sprawl of blackness in particular and the insatiable political demand it presents to a nominally postemancipation society. ( 2008 ,p.6) Neoliberal multiculturalism, or what Sexton calls multiracialism, seeks to rescue racial identity from blackness, which is seen as largely responsible for giving race its offensive and oppositional signification. The neoliberal-multicultural cultural product, then, finds effective ways to situate blackness and black bodies as absent of rationality or agency, and black racial politics an ineffective explanation of, or solution to persistent racial inequity. I am not suggesting that there is a direct line between racial representation and racial intent. That is, my aim is not to provide evidence that the film is racist, or that the filmmakers were motivated by racism. Rather, my argument is that the film was produced, and enters a field of already existing cultural productions, in which race and blackness have already been and continue to be imagined discursively, and in which black bodies are situated materially, disproportionately among the poorest and least regarded. What becomes important and potentially destructive about Waiting for Superman is the extent to which its representations reproduce and reify antiblack imaginations, ideologies and sentiments, even as the filmmakers claim to have offered a cultural product – an officially antiracist cultural product – that advocates for poor black people and other marginalized racial groups.

#### The identification of a ‘China Threat’ cannot be separated from the colonial desires they satisfy and military powers they benefit.

Pan 13, Chengxin Pan, Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Deakin University, Knowledge, Desire and Power in Global Politics Western Representations of China’s Rise, 2013, pg. 82-83

Consequently, for all the claims of the 'China threat’ paradigm to be scientific knowledge and objective truth, it has its roots in power and is well-suited to the service of power. By taking note of the power/knowledge nexus in the construction and function of the China threat knowledge. I do not suggest that every single piece of work in the 'China threat' genre is written under the decree of the Pentagon in exchange for funding and/or political patronage. As noted above, the nexus often takes multiple forms, some of which are subtler, less visible and less direct than others. Indeed, it is in the interest of both knowledge and power that their liaison be kept as covert as possible. This is what I-oucaull means by the "subtle mechanisms' in the production of knowledge where the exercise of power 'becomes capillary".'" In his account of the relationship between the state, the foundations, and international and area studies during the Cold War, Cumings used the term 'going capillary' to describe how, through small, everyday and local avenues, such as decisions on who gets tenure, who edits prestigious journals, which research project gets funded, and which textbooks are adopted, power was able to maintain its presence so that "people do things without being told, and often without knowing the influences on their behavior". 3 Also, once taking on a life of its own, knowledge can span an intertextual, disciplinary and institutional web within which it can self-generate, ostensibly removing itself a step further from power. Thus far, I have critically examined the power/know ledge/desire nexus in the case of the 'China threat1 paradigm. In doing so, I do not imply that the solution lies in the pursuit of pure knowledge and neutral scholarship on the part of those China watchers, who should shun government agencies, which in tuni should stop funding social science research altogether. In the fields of social sciences at least, there is no such thing as pure knowledge, disconnected totally from desire and power. Indeed, as examined at the beginning of this book, pure social knowledge is neither possible nor even desirable. I am not against the power/knowledge/desire nexus per se; rather, my point is that we, as producers of knowledge, should guard against the possibility of being misused and abused by power which often serves special interests. We should be self-conscious and sensitive to the consequences—however unintended or even well-intended—of our knowledge as practice. If all knowledge is linked to power in one way or another, it may beg the question of why the "China threat\* paradigm has been singled out here for criticism. The reason, I submit, is that not all knowledge/power nexuses arc equal in terms of their intertcxtual influence or practical and moral implications. As noted above, associated with the 'China threat' knowledge has been a particular kind of political economy of fear. It not only lays the discursive foundation for military Keynesianism, but also has profound and even dangerous repercussions for Sino-Western relations in general and US-China relations in particular. When acted upon by foreign policy-makers, the "China threat' paradigm runs the risk of turning into a self-fulfilling prophecy, an issue which will be examined in the next chapter.

#### Any risk of a link to the K means you vote neg on presumption---The China threat is not rooted in POLICY, but in an ideology of anti-blackness that began with the Middle Passage

Young book worm 13 (Tag Archives: Anti-Blackness [Bodies, Silence, and Multiracialism: Challenges of Solidarity Between POC](https://loudmouthedbookworm.wordpress.com/2013/08/10/bodies-silence-and-multiracialism-challenges-of-solidarity-between-poc/), https://loudmouthedbookworm.wordpress.com/tag/anti-blackness/)

There is a shared historical context in that exploitation is exploitation, oppression is oppression, etc is etc, and everything feeds back into and upholds the same multivaried and mulitifaceted structure of disparate, yet intersecting and inextricable, systems of oppression that together make up the structure White Supremacist capitalist heteropatriarchy, ie kyriarchy. But it’s not the same. It’s just not. Sexton, drawing on the words of another scholar, puts it best in his lecture. To paraphrase, it is a very different thing to be coming from a slave population than an immigrant population, no matter how lowly such immigrants are regarded. I don’t like getting into Oppression Olympics, mainly because I think playing the game of who had/has it worse is unproductive in most instances. But the fact remains: the historical and ongoing manifestations of anti-Blackness in this country, from the dehumanizing traumas and racial-sexual terror of the Middle Passage, to their reiteration, revisitation and reconstruction under chattel slavery, sharecropping, white neighborhood organizations, Jim Crow, redlining, the Drug War, and the PIC is incomparable to what has been endured by any other marginalized racial group in this country. The exceptionalism of anti-Blackness does not arise from it being a “worse” form of oppression than others Rather, it is anti-Blackness’ foundational role in the construction of White Supremacy that makes it indispensable to that system. Scott Nakagawa put it best, [“anti-black racism is the fulcrum of white supremacy”](http://www.changelabinfo.com/2012/05/04/blackness-is-the-fulcrum/#.Ufl89I3AoZU). That is to say, White Supremacy is particularly reliant on anti-Blackness because of the historical intimacy the two share in their concurrent formation. The racialization of persons of Middle Eastern descent and of Muslim faith, East Asian/Pacific descent, South Asian descent, South Pacific descent, and Hispanic/Latino origin have their roots in this primary, intimate racialization of conqueror and conquered, master and slave. The birth of African slavery was also Europe’s first foray into colonialism. Later, it was slavery, an institution reliant on captivity, commodification, debasement, and racial-sexual terror to maintain a greater system of forced labor, genocidal expansion, and economic extraction, that provided the capital and the labor necessary to the preservation and projection of an intercontinental empire conceived of and realized in the name of White Supremacy. An empire that has persisted to this day, in spite of great ruptures. Blackness has a unique relationship to Whiteness. As Sexton mentions, paraphrasing once more, it is possible to be anti-Black and not anti-X, but it is not possible to be anti-X and not anti-Black. This fact is present in everyone’s life. For example, I am a person of color. However, I can still participate in anti-Blackness. More than that, I may do so and benefit from it, whether in housing, employment, education, or a couple other things. Even though I’ll never have White Privilege, I can still take a few chips home if I play my cards right. Latasha Harlin, 15, was shot dead in LA by Soon Ja Du, a Korean store owner, on March 16, 1991. Soon Ja Du, 51, was found guilty of voluntary manslaughter, and sentenced to five years probation, 400 hours of community service, and a $500 fine. Well, until America’s next war in the Asia-Pacific region. I am sure it will be fought for glorious reasons. Even so, hypothetically, if I were a good boy and sat very still for the whole thing, I might be ok. But I don’t plan on it. This is where the 0.1% comes in. Non-Black people of color need to be conscious of the capacity to participate in anti-Blackness and how all non-Black bodies are positioned and permitted to benefit from participation in anti-Blackness. However, real solidarity cannot be created unilaterally, and the fact remains that Black people in this country have historically benefitted from and participated in anti-Asianness, anti-Arabness, Orientalism, Islamophobia and nativism in a manner similar to how Asian (in the most encompassing, continental sense of the word) people have benefitted from and participated in anti-Blackness. The project of empire began with the enslavement of Africans and the conquest of the Americas, and reached its zenith with the colonization of Asia. From the beginning, Asia was the goal of the imperial project. Columbus sailed west seeking India to increase his patrons’ profits from and control over the spice trade. The British, French, and Dutch Empires reached the height of their power with the conquest and plundering of Asia. America, too, first globally projected its power with the Spanish-American War, a conflict with fronts in Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines. Since 1898, US military power has established, defended, and maintained global hegemony through racialized military intervention in China, Japan, Laos, Samoa, Indonesia, Iran, Micronesia, the Sandwich Islands, the Philippines, Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Afghanistan, Turkey, Yemen, Egypt, Libya, and Pakistan. Every time, these places were/are deemed “strategically important” enough for “American lives” to be sacrificed, but little to no information is ever recorded or given with any regularity on the number of local casualties. That is because these conflicts are not about locals, they are about American interests, morals, and way of life.

## Block

### Kritik

#### We straight turn mills.

Kelley, 15—Gary B. Nash Professor of American History at UCLA (Robin D.G., “Beyond Black Lives Matter,” Kalfou, Vol. 2, Iss. 2, (Fall 2015): 330-337, dml)

This implicit appeal to acknowledge us-to recognize our humanity, our dignity, and our right to live-is understandable in a world where the statesanctioned killing and caging of Black bodies is routine. But as George Lipsitz observed, such appeals are embedded in a humanist logic that emphasizes "interiority" and feeling, thereby elevating "the cultivation of sympathy over the creation of social justice."7 That is to say, our feelings of empathy in any representation of suffering are designed to be understood and individually felt rather than transformed into collective praxis. This is partly why concepts like reparations are so antithetical to modern liberalism. Given the trauma produced by an endless video loop of Black people dying at the hands of police officers who are almost never indicted, let alone prosecuted and convicted, collective healing and the cultivation of sympathy are to be expected. On one hand, this makes the movement's counterslogan, "All Lives Matter," all the more offensive and painful. "All Lives Matter" is heard and felt as a belittling or decentering of anti-Black racism. It trades on postracial myths of equivalency in suffering. On the other hand, sometimes we react to "All Lives Matter" with such hostility that it stands in as an unambiguous expression of anti-Black racism. Can we salvage these words? Don't we want to build a world in which every life is valuable, cherished, and sustained? Are we not seeking a world that recognizes multiple sites of dispossession and recognizes that state violence inside US borders is inseparable from US militarism around the world? The fact that we are compelled to a defensive position is a consequence of focusing on proving our value rather than critiquing the system that devalues all of us and destroys the world in the process.

The veracity of our humanity was never the issue-then or now. The problem lies with Western civilization's very construction of the human. As Sylvia Wynter, Cedric Robinson, Aimé Césaire and others have been saying for decades, the "Negro" was an invention, a fiction-like that of the Indian, the Oriental, the "Mexican," etc. Or in Frantz Fanon's oft-quoted line from The Wretched of the Earth: "It is the colonist who fabricated and continues to fabricate the colonized subject."8 Indeed, the entire structure of global white supremacy depends on such inventions, like the fictions of the Arab as non- or anti-Western and the "Immigrant" as essentially Latino/a, or the notion that indigenous people (in North America at least) are all dead. This is why we have such a hard time acknowledging that most so-called immigrants from Mexico and Central America are, in fact, indigenous.

The very foundations of Western civilization were built on such fabrications and enacted through violence. Once they crumble, so goes Western civilization's conceit as well as the massive philosophical smokescreen that enables (racial) capitalism-the greatest, most destructive, most violent crime wave in history-to masquerade as the engine of progress, a pure expression of freedom and liberty, the only path to human emancipation. The modern world that invented the Negro, the Oriental, the Indian, and the Savage as a means of inventing European Man was built on the theft of humans, theft of land and water, indiscriminate murder, violation of customary rights, moral economy, enclosure of the commons, destruction of the planet-outright lawlessness, justified by supposed rationality or what Weber might call instrumental rationality. To leave it at Black Lives Matter unintentionally conceals the crime. After all, these were the very processes that birthed the liberal humanism to which BLM activists seem to appeal.

In his book Forgeries of Memory and Meaning, Cedric Robinson further elaborates on the systems of racial maintenance and myth making, the "racial regimes" responsible for the inventions of the Negro (the Indian, the Oriental) and their relation to capital. What exactly are racial regimes? In Robinson's words, they "are constructed social systems in which race is proposed as a justification for the relations of power." The power is real and formidable but surprisingly unstable. For Robinson, "the covering conceit of a racial regime is a makeshift patchwork masquerading as memory and the immutable. Nevertheless, racial regimes do possess history, that is, discernible origins and mechanisms of assembly. But racial regimes are unrelentingly hostile to their exhibition."9 In other words, to say that anti-Blackness is foundational to Western civilization is not to say that it is fixed or permanent. On the contrary, it is incredibly fragile and must be constantly remade; it is epiphenomenal to the production of Blackness-which is an essential component of modern racial regimes, but not its totality. In the last century alone, racial regimes have been remade, reconfigured, destabilized, and consolidated many times, employing new technologies to circulate old racial fabulations and new fictions in the process of capitalist expansion.

Proving one's humanity will not uproot racial regimes, for the very evidence of our humanity is their raison d'etre. Our exploitation is evidence of our value, but it requires enormous intellectual, juridical, and psychic resources to conceal our humanity. Slavery was not just social death, but was based on a cost-benefit analysis that assumed the disposability of Black lives. The system of extracting surplus emerged within a logic of racial hierarchy and racial subjugation that dragged Africans, Asians, and Europeans proletarianized by enclosure to the lands of the Americas, Oceania, parts of South Asia and Africa, and the Eastern Mediterranean-where indigenous people were dispossessed, enslaved, or exploited by other means. Enclosure is yet another example of theft and violence masking as "law, order, security": backed by the rule of law, the state employs violence to discipline, to reclassify, to criminalize, and to destroy sovereignty and create disorder. Enclosure is part of this process of war-a war on the commons, which ultimately turns some of the expropriated people into a proletariat (including European industrial, maritime, and landless rural labor, as well as prostitutes and beggars), turns a portion into settlers, and sends a portion to the workhouse. Some are merely casualties whose flesh mingles with the earth and whose bodies-sometimes hanging from a tree or broken on the wheel-serve to terrorize those who resist the new discipline.10

While the value of Black labor may have ebbed and flowed with the changing character of the global economy, there has never been a moment in US history when our humanity mattered, when Black people could enjoy full privileges and protections of citizenship. But the same can be said of most of the planet-at least until the mid-twentieth century, although I would venture to say this is still the case. What Black resistance calls into question is the inhumanity of the system, the inhumanity of those who subjugate in the name of civilization; it insists that the survival of humanity (and this is not the humanity defined by the Enlightenment) depends on the complete destruction of racial capitalism, patriarchy, and regimes of normativity.

As I wrote in the aftermath of the George Zimmerman verdict, unless we come to terms with this history, we will continue to believe that the system just needs to be tweaked, or the right-wing fringe defeated, or our humanity acknowledged.11 We will miss the routine character of state violence; its origins in the very formation of colonialism, slavery, and capitalism; and the ways in which routine violence has become a central component of US policies, including drone warfare and targeted killing. We cannot change the situation simply by finding the right legal strategy, the best policies, or recognition.

#### Look to their Wong 20 card- it provides a terminal impact and root cause argument for the K by saying existing racial structures will collapse the international order.

Wong ’20 [Johnson; Graduate School of Public and International Affairs @ UOttowa; “Digital Divide: Geotechnology, Politics and the International System”; <https://ruor.uottawa.ca/bitstream/10393/41017/1/WONG%2C%20Johnson%2020205.pdf>; AS]

Despite the power of institutions and the strength of international organizations to resolve conflicts, the digital divide brought on by technology, economic self-interest, and centuries of culture, will necessarily disrupt the existing international system. Even within Western liberal democratic countries, there continues to be significant systemic confrontations as long-running grievances remain unresolved, such as historical racial divisions, the surge in right-wing populism, and a growing inequality gap. Internationally, there is a shift in the character and ability of international institutions themselves to resolve disputes through existing mechanisms, such as the ABM treaty, the CFE treaty, and the INF treaty. These are a few examples of the breakdown of existing international constructs (Hall, 2019, 4). At the same time, China will continue to offer, in partnership with its Russian and other Eurasian allies, an alternative political model that will emphasize the values and qualities which are important to those societies: social stability, economic prosperity, and national strength. Zhao summarizes this argument “In the final analysis, there is a choice between a Confucius capitalist China that is trying to integrate with a socially and ecologically unsustainable planetary capitalist order and a renewed socialist China that is leading a post-capitalist and post-consumerist, sustainable developmental path as part and parcel of an alternative globalization” (Zhao, 2013, 27). The separation between capitalism and political liberalism is an intentional strategy meant to demonstrate that state governance can be effective without political change. The Chinese model will also emphasize regional strength while avoiding ideas about global tyranny so long as the US continues to be portrayed as an international bully and troublemaker that acts with impunity. On the character about the Internet itself, the seeds of doubt had already been made in various forums: “At the Forum of Independent Local and Regional Media in 2014, Putin labeled the Internet ‘a special CIA project’, adding that the United States wanted to retain their monopoly over it” (Budnitsky and Jia, 2018, 607). The digital divide will become another point of division to separate the global community this century, and as a means for authoritarians to consolidate power. While military conflict may be avoidable, cyberconflict and the use of hybrid warfare – involving careful coordination between state and non-state actors – may take place more often as state forces engage online in efforts to upset the new status quo. The benefits of technology, such as 5G and beyond, may also challenge trends and perspectives about values and culture on both sides as societies and the role of technology to support individual, corporate or state interests evolve.

#### Look to their Gurumurthy 19 card that says the Global South lacks the technical capacity to secure white competitive markets-

Gurumurthy ’19 [Anita et al; Executive Director of IfTC and Expert Advisor for the UN Secretary General; “PLATFORM PLANET DEVELOPMENT IN THE INTELLIGENCE ECONOMY”; <https://itforchange.net/platformpolitics/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/Platform-Planet-Development-in-the-Intelligence-Economy_ITfC_2019.pdf>; AS]

Platform governance: the way forward

Platform governance is an overarching development policy challenge of our times, not just a narrow technology policy issue. A planetwide restructuring of economic ecosystems by digital platforms has triggered new contestations over socio-structural relations and geopolitical power. This calls for a cohesive policy response that can adequately and appropriately reorient the platform mode of economic organization towards a more equitable distribution of the efficiencies of intelligence scale economies. Such a policy approach also needs to be multi-scalar (spanning interventions at global to national and local levels) as well as cross-sectoral (encompassing integrated actions in digital, economic and social policy domains). We summarize the challenges for policy development in this chapter, also discussing the key building blocks of a comprehensive policy framework.

4.1 Governance challenges in the platform economy

a) Old laws don’t work: Most countries in the Global South lack legislative frameworks that address the rights and development implications of platformization trends. For example, as we found, individuals engaged in platform-mediated service work across different sectors – domestic work in the Philippines, tourism in Indonesia, and transportation in South Africa – are not covered under pre-existing labor laws (Barrameda et al., 2019; Bentley & Maharika, 2019; Mare et al., 2019). Similarly, the interests of small and medium enterprises and consumers are not adequately protected against unfair trade practices of platform companies in emerging digital commerce markets such as Nigeria (Nuruddeen et al., 2018). Even developed countries with legal-institutional frameworks for human rights enforcement and corporate accountability – such as EU member states – face difficulties in coping with the ongoing digital disruption. In France and Belgium, robust pre-digital labor laws are proving inadequate in providing social protection to platform workers with atypical employment contracts. Similarly, the application of preexisting consumer protection frameworks to digital services in the EU has meant the use of blanket disclaimer clauses by platform firms, with no explanations about obligations arising in the online context (Delronge et al., 2019). When new legislation specific to the digital context, such as the GDPR, has been introduced, the penalties for violation may often not be deterrent enough (Hintz & Brand, 2019). It has been found that companies such as Google, which have been repeatedly fined by the European Commission for non-compliance with prevailing legislation, nonchalantly continue their illegal market practices by treating fines as the costs of doing business.

b) State responses are knee-jerk: Platform regulation often times tends to be ‘scandal-prompted’. For example, in China, it was public outrage over the rape and murder of two female passengers by DiDi Hitch drivers in 2018 that prompted the ministry of transport to set up a national supervision platform for systematic background verification of the drivers enrolled with ride-hailing companies (Chen et al., 2019). Similarly, in Uruguay, the central bank rushed in to hastily regulate the P2P lending sector without fully understanding its operational dynamics as a response to increasing negative national media coverage about the sector becoming a ‘financial Uber’ (Aguirre & GarciaRivadulla, 2019).

c) Platforms become boundary objects, interpreted differently by different state agencies: The conflicting imperatives to create an enabling environment for the growth of the domestic digital sector whilst guarding against the monopolistic and exclusionary tendencies of the platform economy seem to culminate in a Catch-22 scenario impeding effective policy development. For example, in Argentina, there was a bitter tug-of-war between the Ministry of Production and the Argentine revenue service (AFIP) about the application of tax laws to the regional e-commerce platform MercadoLibre. While the Ministry of Production called for exempting the platform from tax liability as part of its larger strategy of encouraging domestic digital industry, the AFIP was of the opinion that MercadoLibre ought to be treated as a commercial firm rather than as a technology company. The Ministry of Production had its way, but it is difficult to ascertain whether the decision to treat MercadoLibre as a technology company deserving of tax exemptions will fare better for the long term health of the Argentinian economy in comparison to the AFIP proposal (Artopoulos, 2019).

d) Big platforms are mythified as the necessary route to success: The myth-making that surrounds platforms also means that governments, especially in the Global South, adopt pro-platform policy approaches. The promise of innovation and opportunity has often led governments to valorize platforms as an enabling force in aiding national growth. There has existed in the tech industry, even before the platform era, an “alliance capitalism” between industries of innovation and policy (Higgins, 2015, as cited in Chen et al., 2019). Consider the 2018 bid by Amazon for its new headquarters, which had city and state governments in the US outdoing one another to offer sops, tax cuts, economic incentives and even political positions to the company, convinced by the potential for jobs and economic growth that Amazon could bring in for the economy (City Lab, 2018b). Or, as in China’s case, where the Internet Plus vision has catalyzed and championed the growth of private platforms in many ways (Chen et al., 2019).

e) Platform companies tend to usurp public policy spaces: By becoming a part of the multi-stakeholder processes that drive policy, platforms take on a direct role in norm and rule development. Such formal membership in governance spaces raises concerns about conflict of interest. In Argentina, when traditional banks raised concerns over MercadoLibre’s new offerings for fintech services, the company successfully negotiated with the government to set up a commission to liaison between the central bank and itself, also managing to get a seat on the commission (Artopoulos, 2019). In December 2018, Netflix’s director of regulation was appointed to Brazil’s film board, Conselho Superior de Cinema, a recognition that the platform is an increasingly important player in the country’s media regulation discussions (Valente & Luciano, 2019).

f) The lack of binding international law gives corporations runaway power: There is no binding global legal framework to check corporate abuse and violation of human rights. Transnational digital companies not only flout domestic legislation with impunity, but also exploit the lack of cross-jurisdictional rules. When faced with the risk of prosecution for unfair market practices in national courts, they evade responsibility by transferring liability to their parent company outside the jurisdiction (Mare et al., 2019; Van Eck & Nemusimbori, 2018). For example, in 2017, the South African Transport and Allied Workers Union brought a case to the national Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) on how Uber’s arbitrary deactivation and termination of drivers enrolled on the platform constituted a violation of protections against unfair dismissal under the country’s existing labor laws. CCMA took up proceedings against Uber SA, the South African subsidiary of the global platform company, and ruled in favour of the plaintiffs. A year later, the company managed to get the ruling overturned in the Labor Court on the technicality that Uber SA was a mere recruitment and training agency for Uber BV based in the Netherlands, which provided the app and made payments to partner-drivers.

4.2. Curbing digital monopolies

The platform economy displays monopolistic tendencies that curtail economic innovation and deepen inequality; but by no means is this an inevitability (Mann & Iazzolino, 2019). Traditional legal approaches to managing the rights, relations and conduct of persons and businesses engaged in commerce demand a major overhaul in the digital context (See Figure 5). This pertains to both commercial laws and to new rules concerning techno-design.

4.2.1 Changes to commercial laws

a) Competition law: Current approaches in competition law tend to regard short term consumer pricing gains as an adequate indicator of vibrant market competition (Khan, 2019). Understandably, this signal becomes extremely misleading in emerging digital markets where dominant platform companies often pursue strategies of free/deep-discounted products and services with an eye on long term consolidation of the network-data advantage for market domination (Curbing Corporate Power Alliance, 2019). In this scenario, competition law must move away from a narrow, neoliberal consumer welfarist approach. Instead, it must adopt economic structuralism as a framework to address the undue advantage that digital platforms enjoy in their role as “unavoidable trading partners” in the multisided markets they control (Cremer et al., 2019). The unique vantage that platforms occupy enables them to engage in upstream and downstream price manipulation, which policy must be able to check. The opacity that surrounds such data-supported gaming by platform companies makes it difficult to identify and establish proof of willful anti-competitive conduct. The EU has attempted to address this through its February 2019 regulation for platform businesses. It has mandated a duty of transparency (to be effective by 2020) with regard to standard terms and conditions of service (including data practices and notice of changes in terms of services) on all platform intermediaries providing digital services. This covers search engines, e-commerce marketplaces, app stores, social media and even price comparison tools. In addition, it has provided user guarantees for a right to explanation pertaining to algorithmic ranking and prioritization of goods and services on platform marketplaces (European Commission Press Release, 2019).

### Competitiveness

#### Their read of Chinese motives is speculation without evidence

Swaine 17– senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and one of the most prominent American analysts in Chinese security studies (Michael, “Managing Asia’s Security Threats in the Trump Era” 1/19, <http://carnegieendowment.org/publications/?fa=67746>

Regardless of its motives, China’s more recent, escalatory behavior has contributed significantly to the buildup in tensions in the disputed SCS and ECS areas. Beijing has refused to specify the precise nature of its claims both to individual land features and to the waters within the nine-dashed line in the SCS, and it has rejected the above-mentioned tribunal ruling (asserting that certain exceptions to such a ruling under UNCLOS Article 298 apply). Further, China seemed to assert the legal right of an archipelagic nation to draw boundary lines between the Paracel and perhaps the Spratly Islands in order to establish interior territorial waters, created sizable artificial islands with dual civilian-military facilities in the Spratlys, and regularly deployed a significant number of vessels and some aircraft near and sometimes into the territorial space of the S/D Islands. Due to all of this, many observers understandably assume the worst-case for China’s motives, ascribing them to the much larger, more aggressive and confrontational strategic motives outlined above. This interpretation is purely speculative, however, and is certainly not confirmed by any authoritative Chinese statements or documents. In fact, China’s actions and statements can be most logically explained by the above interactive dynamic, which centers first and foremost on the maritime disputes themselves. Indeed, when measured against the metric of a supposed direct challenge to the U.S. position in Asia, Beijing’s actions seem cautious, even timid. It generally avoids the use of warships to assert its claims, has given assurances that it does not intend to militarize the Spratly Islands, and has certainly not attempted to seize land features held by other claimants to assure its control of the area. Moreover, Beijing continues to insist that it is dedicated to a peaceful, negotiated solution of the disputes and supports the peaceful objectives of the 2002 declaration. In general, it is attempting to increase its influence in both seas without increasing the chance of armed conflict with the United States. This could all change, of course, as China’s power in the area increases, and those in and out of the Trump camp who call for a zero-sum confrontation with Beijing over the maritime disputes assert that it certainly will, because China’s caution thus far conceals its “real” expansionist and aggressive motives. Again, this is pure speculation, but of a dangerous sort, since if accepted as a basis for U.S. policy it would basically lock in a zero-sum interpretation of every assertive Chinese action, thereby justifying an equally zero-sum U.S. move in response. And of course, such actions would indeed cause Beijing to eventually adopt precisely the threatening motives that some observers insist (incorrectly) are already present. Unfortunately, this type of overt and adversarial strategic competition is given significant impetus by the writings of the international media; the public interpretations of hardline pundits and “experts” in the United States, China, and other countries; and even some government officials on all sides. These sources already to a great extent seem to interpret every U.S. and Chinese statement and action of possible relevance to the disputed maritime areas as part of a titanic Sino-U.S. struggle for strategic dominance in Asia, thus pushing the two countries toward confrontation. Beyond basing itself on a purely speculative and dangerous set of assumptions about Chinese motives, a zero-sum, confrontational argument calling for a doubling down of U.S. capabilities in the Western Pacific also employs another highly dubious (at best) set of assumptions regarding American and Chinese defense spending relevant to Asia. Barring an unlikely near-total collapse of the Chinese economy and/or a major surge in the overall U.S. GDP, Washington will not possess the capacity to greatly exceed the kind of military and economic capabilities that China will be able to bring to bear in its nearby maritime areas over the coming years. In fact, projections by scholars at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and other reputable sources predict a much more likely movement toward parity between U.S. and Chinese capabilities in that region, in other words, a de facto strategic equilibrium.

#### Peaceful transition to a Chinese-led order prevents great power nuclear war—US reassertion of a lead role fails and breaks down institutions

Mazarr, 17—Senior Political Scientist at the RAND Corporation and Associate Director of the Strategy, Doctrine, and Resources Program at the RAND Corporation's Arroyo Center (Michael, “The Once and Future Order: What Comes After Hegemony?,” Foreign Affairs (Jan/Feb 2017): 25-32, dml)

Few foreign policy issues have attracted more attention in recent years than the problem of sustaining the U.S.-led liberal international order. After World War II, the United States sponsored a set of institutions, rules, and norms designed to avoid repeating the mistakes of the 1930s and promote peace, prosperity, and democracy. The resulting system has served as the bedrock of U.S. national security strategy ever since. In everything from arms control to peacekeeping to trade to human rights, marrying U.S. power and international norms and institutions has achieved significant results. Washington continues to put maintaining the international order at the center of the United States' global role. Yet the survival of that order-indeed, of any ordering principles at all-now seems in question. Dissatisfied countries such as China and Russia view its operation as unjust, and people around the world are angry about the economic and social price they've had to pay for globalization. It's not clear exactly what Presidentelect Donald Trump's views are on the role of the United States in the world, much less the liberal order, but his administration will confront the most profound foreign policy task that any new administration has faced in 70 years: rethinking the role that the international order should play in U.S. grand strategy. Whatever Trump's own views, the instincts of many in Washington will be to attempt to restore a unified, U.S.-dominated system by confronting the rule breakers and aggressively promoting liberal values. This would be the wrong approach; in trying to hold the old order together, Washington could end up accelerating its dissolution. What the United States must learn to do instead is navigate and lead the more diversified, pluralistic system that is now materializing-one with a bigger role for emerging-market powers and more ways for countries other than the United States to lead than the current order provides. THE HOUSE THAT WE BUILT The creation of the current order, like that of its two modern predecessors-the Concert of Europe and the League of Nations-was an effort to design the basic architecture of international relations in the wake of a war among major powers. All three orders used a range of tools- organizations, treaties, informal meetings, and norms-to attain the goals of their creators. The current order's main institutions include the United Nations, nato, the World Trade Organization, the International Monetary Fund (imf), the World Bank, and the G-20. Together, these bodies have influenced almost every aspect of the modern world. The un has provided a forum for the international community to rally around shared interests and ratify joint action. The international financial institutions have boosted trade and stabilized the global economy during crises. Multilateral treaties and agreements brokered through various bodies have helped avoid chaotic arms races and uncontrolled nuclear proliferation. And dense global networks of experts, activists, businesses, and nonprofits, operating within the framework of the liberal order, have built consensus and taken action on hundreds of other issues. The rules of any such order are not self-enforcing. When combined with direct state power, however, they encourage governments to accept norms of conduct such as nonaggression, the avoidance of nuclear weapons, and respect for human rights. The United States would be wise to do what it can to sustain these norms in the future. The trick is figuring out how to do so-and what, given all the changes the world is now experiencing, the emerging order should look like. THE NOT-SO-LIBERAL ORDER The postwar liberal order has proved remarkably stable. But it has always incorporated two distinct and not necessarily reconcilable visions. One is a narrow, cautious view of the un and the core international financial institutions as guardians of sovereign equality, territorial inviolability, and a limited degree of free trade. The other is a more ambitious agenda: protecting human rights, fostering democratic political systems, promoting free-market economic reforms, and encouraging good governance. Until recently, the tension between these two visions did not pose a serious problem. For many decades, the Cold War allowed the United States and its allies to gloss over the gap in the name of upholding a unified front against the Soviets. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Washington fully embraced the more ambitious approach by expanding nato up to Russia's doorstep; intervening to protect human rights in places such as the Balkans and Libya; supporting uprisings, at least rhetorically, in the name of democracy in countries including Egypt, Georgia, and Myanmar; and applying increasingly sophisticated economic sanctions to illiberal governments. In the newly unipolar international system, Washington often behaved as if the narrower concept of order had been superseded by the more ambitious one. At the same time, the United States often took advantage of its preeminence to sidestep the order's rules and institutions when it found them inconvenient. The problem with this approach, of course, is that international orders gain much of their potency by defining the sources of prestige and status within the system, such as participation in and leadership of international institutions. Their stability depends on leading members abiding-and being seen to abide-by key norms of behavior. When the leader of an order consistently appears to others to interpret the rules as it sees fit, the legitimacy of the system is undermined and other countries come to believe that the order offends, rather than sustains, their dignity. An extreme version of this occurred in the 1930s, when a series of perceived insults convinced Japan-once a strong supporter of the League of Nations-that the system was a racist, Anglo-American cabal designed to emasculate it. Partly as a result, Japan withdrew from the league and signed the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy before entering World War II. Today, a similar story is playing out as some countries see the United States as applying norms selectively and in its own favor, norms that are already tailored to U.S. interests. This is persuading them that the system's main function is to validate the United States' status and prestige at the expense of their own. For years now, a number of countries, including Brazil, India, South Africa, and Turkey, have found various ways to express their frustration with the current rules. But China and Russia have become the two most important dissenters. These two countries view the order very differently and have divergent ambitions and strategies. Yet their broad complaints have much in common. Both countries feel disenfranchised by a U.S.-dominated system that imposes strict conditions on their participation and, they believe, menaces their regimes by promoting democracy. And both countries have called for fundamental reforms to make the order less imperial and more pluralistic. Russian officials are particularly disillusioned. They believe that they made an honest effort to join Western- led institutions after the fall of the Soviet Union but were spurned by the West, which subjected them to a long series of insults: nato's attacks on Serbia in the Balkan wars of the 1990s; nato enlargement into eastern Europe; and Western support for "color revolutions" in the early years of the new century, which threatened or in some cases actually overthrew Russian-backed leaders in several eastern European countries. In a June 2016 speech to Russian diplomats, Russian President Vladimir Putin complained that certain Western states "continue stubborn attempts to retain their monopoly on geopolitical domination," arguing that this was leading to a "confrontation between different visions of how to build the global governance mechanisms in the 21st century." And Putin hasn't just limited himself to complaining. In recent years, Russia has taken a number of dramatic, sometimes violent steps-especially in Europe-to weaken the U.S.-led order. China also feels disrespected. The financial crisis at the end of the last decade convinced many Chinese that the West had entered a period of rapid decline and that China deserved a more powerful voice in the international system. Since then, Beijing has increased its influence in several institutions, including the imf and the World Bank. But the changes have not gone far enough for many Chinese leaders. They still chafe at Western domination of these bodies, perceive U.S. democracy promotion as a threat, and resent the regional network of U.S. alliances that surrounds China. Beijing has thus undertaken a range of economic initiatives to gain more influence within the current order, including increasing its development aid and founding the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which it clearly intends to compete with the imf and the World Bank. China has also pursued its interests in defiance of global norms by building islands in contested international waters and harassing U.S. aircraftin the South China Sea. Worrisome as these developments are, it is important not to exaggerate the threats they represent. Neither China nor Russia has declared itself an enemy of the postwar order (although Russia is certainly moving in that direction). Both continue to praise the core un system and participate actively in a host of institutions, treaties, and diplomatic processes. Indeed, China has worked hard to embed itself ever more firmly in the current order. In a 2015 speech in Seattle, Chinese President Xi Jinping said that "China has been a participant, builder, and contributor" in, of, and to the system and that it stood "firmly for the international order" based on the purposes and principles outlined in the un Charter. China and Russia both rely on cross-border trade, international energy markets, and global information networks-all of which depend heavily on international rules and institutions. And at least for the time being, neither country seems anxious to challenge the order militarily. Many major countries, including China and Russia, are groping toward roles appropriate to their growing power in a rapidly evolving international system. If that system is going to persevere, their grievances and ambitions must be accommodated. This will require a more flexible, pluralistic approach to institutions, rules, and norms. ALL THE RAGE Another threat to the liberal order comes from the populist uprisings now under way in many countries around the world, which have been spurred on by outrage at increasing economic inequality, uneasiness with cultural and demographic changes, and anger at a perceived loss of national sovereignty. For the liberal order to survive, the populations of its member countries must embrace its basic social and political values. That embrace is now weakening. The postwar order has driven global integration and liberalization by encouraging free-trade agreements, developing international law, and fostering global communications networks. Such developments strengthened the order in turn by cementing public support for liberal values. But the populist rebellion against globalization now imperils that virtuous circle. The populist surge has featured outbursts in Europe and the United States against the perceived intrusions necessary of a globalizing order. Public support for new trade agreements has tumbled. Resentment toward supranational authorities, such as the European Union, has risen steadily, as has suspicion of and hostility toward immigrants and immigration. The uprising has already claimed one major casualty-the United Kingdom's eu membership-and is mutating into angry, xenophobic nationalism in countries as diverse as Austria, Denmark, France, Greece, Hungary, the Netherlands, Russia, Sweden, and the United States. So far, none of these countries has totally rejected the international order. Populism remains a minority trend in most electorates, and support for liberal principles remains robust in many countries. In a 2016 Gallup survey, for example, 58 percent of Americans polled indicated that they saw trade as an opportunity rather than a threat- the highest number since 1992. Similarly, a 2016 poll by the Pew Research Center found that support for the UN among Americans had grown by nine points since 2004, to a new peak of 64 percent. Reassuring as such findings are, however, if even a quarter or a third of citizens turn decisively against liberal values in a critical mass of nations, it can destabilize the entire system. In some cases, this happens because radical parties or individuals can come to power without ever achieving more than a plurality of support. More commonly, a rejectionist bloc can ~~cripple~~ [wreck] legislatures by obstructing steps, such as trade deals and arms treaties, that would strengthen the prevailing order. And sometimes, as happened with the British vote to leave the eu, committed opponents of the order are joined by a larger number of worried citizens in a successful effort to roll back elements of the system. MIX IT UP International orders tend to rest on two pillars: the balance of power and prestige among the leading members and some degree of shared values. Both of these pillars look shaky today. For many years, U.S. grand strategy has been based on the idea that the unitary U.S.-led order reflected universal values, was easy to join, and exercised a gravitational pull on other countries. Those assumptions do not hold as strongly as they once did. If Washington hopes to sustain an international system that can help avoid conflict, raise prosperity, and promote liberal values, it will have to embrace a more diverse order-one that operates in different ways for different countries and regions and on different issues. The United States will be tempted to resist such a change and to double down on the existing liberal order by following the Cold War playbook: rallying democracies and punishing norm breakers. But such a narrow order would create more embittered outcasts and thus imperil the most fundamental objective of any global order: keeping the peace among great powers. Dividing the world into defenders and opponents of a shared order is also likely to be less feasible than in the past. China's role in the global economy and its standing as a regional power mean that it cannot be isolated in the way the Soviet Union was. Many of today's rising powers, moreover, have preferences that are too diverse to gather into either a U.S.-led system or a bloc opposed to it.

#### Nuclear war doesn’t cause extinction – takes millions of warheads, explosions don’t hit every part of the planet, and expert consensus proves

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There is a large quantity of research on nuclear weapons and the consequences of nuclear conflict. Here we can offer the reader only a short and incomplete review of the basic conclusions considered exclusively from the point of view of whether nuclear conflict might lead to complete human extinction. I will notice that the considerable part of the information on the nuclear weapon is still classified, and so suggested conclusions cannot be absolutely credible. A classic example of threat to human civilization and to the existence of mankind is threat of nuclear war. Usually it is said about nuclear war, that it will result in ((destruction of all terrestrial life». However, this statement is a complete exaggeration. The nuclear weapon has three ways in which it could cause global destruction: direct strike of all area of the Earth, radioactive contamination of the entire Earth, and the effects of “nuclear winter Further we will show, that though each of these effects can lead in special circumstances to human extinction, the typical nuclear war, which is the most likely disaster, will not result in full human extinction (though hundreds of millions or even a couple billion may die in the aftermath). Classical nuclear war does not assume attack to all places of residing of people, but only on the opponent and its allies and so cannot lead to the extinction of mankind by the direct damage effects of the nuclear weapon. However, it is possible to consider a highly hypothetical situation when the nuclear attack is put in all places of residing of people. We will estimate, what quantity of warheads is necessary to destroy all people without an exception in case of nuclear attacks in regular space intervals and simultaneously on all surface of the Earth. Destruction of all people on a land would need not less (and it is considerably more) than 100 000 warheads of a megaton class. (If to consider, that one warhead cover the area in 1000 sq. km which is probably overestimated. The guaranteed destruction will demand much bigger number of warheads as even around explosion epicenter in Hiroshima were survived - in 500 meters from an explosion point.) At the same time, huge sites of a land are uninhabited. It is intelligent to assume, that 100 000 warheads will put people on a side survival though will not destroy all the people, as there are ships, planes, the casual survived and underground refuges. The guaranteed destruction of all people, probably, will demand millions warheads. It is necessary to notice, that on peak of cold war leading powers possessed quantity of warheads of an order 100 000, and the saved up stocks of plutonium (2000 tons, though it is not “weapon” grade plutonium, that is, pure plutonium-239 on isotope structure; however, the tests conducted in the USA have shown, that not weapon plutonium can also be used for nuclear explosions, but with a smaller exit of energy) allow to make several hundreds thousand warheads. At the same time, any scenario of nuclear war does not assume uniform blow on all area of a planet. On the other hand, it is theoretically possible to create such quantity of bombs and delivery systems, to strike to all planet area. Other researchers also come to similar conclusions - that nuclear war in itself cannot lead to human extinction. Besides, there are no publications which would specify in risks of full human extinction as a result of direct influence of nuclear explosions of usual capacity (instead of the subsequent effects in the form of radioactive contamination and nuclear winter.)

#### China’s drive for regional hegemony is peaceful and not zero-sum with the U.S.---the only scenario for an aggressive rise to power is in response to signals that the U.S. could successfully deny China’s status claims

Heer 19 [Paul, National Intelligence Officer for East Asia in the Office of the Director of National Intelligence from 2007 to 2015, the Robert E. Wilhelm Research Fellow at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for International Studies and an Adjunct Professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs, Jan 8, 2019, “Rethinking U.S. Primacy in East Asia,” <https://nationalinterest.org/print/blog/skeptics/rethinking-us-primacy-east-asia-40972>]

First, China is pursuing hegemony in East Asia, but not an exclusive hostile hegemony. It is not trying to extrude the United States from the region or deny American access there. The Chinese have long recognized the utility—and the benefits to China itself—of U.S. engagement with the region, and they have indicated receptivity to peaceful coexistence and overlapping spheres of influence with the United States there. Moreover, China is not trying to impose its political or economic system on its neighbors, and it does not seek to obstruct commercial freedom of navigation in the region (because no country is more dependent on freedom of the seas than China itself). In short, Beijing wants to extend its power and influence within East Asia, but not as part of a “winner-take-all” contest.

China does have unsettled and vexing sovereignty claims over Taiwan, most of the islands and other features in the East and South China Seas, and their adjacent waters. Although Beijing has demonstrated a willingness to use force in defense or pursuit of these claims, it is not looking for excuses to do so. Whether these disputes can be managed or resolved in a way that is mutually acceptable to the relevant parties and consistent with U.S. interests in the region is an open, long-term question. But that possibility should not be ruled out on the basis of—or made more difficult by—false assumptions of irreconcilable interests. On the contrary, it should be pursued on the basis of a recognition that all the parties want to avoid conflict—and that the sovereignty disputes in the region ultimately are not military problems requiring military solutions. And since Washington has never been opposed in principle to reunification between China and Taiwan as long as it is peaceful, and similarly takes no position on the ultimate sovereignty of the other disputed features, their long-term disposition need not be the litmus test of either U.S. or Chinese hegemony in the region.

Of course, China would prefer not to have forward-deployed U.S. military forces in the Western Pacific that could be used against it, but Beijing has long tolerated and arguably could indefinitely tolerate an American military presence in the region—unless that presence is clearly and exclusively aimed at coercing or containing China. It is also true that Beijing disagrees with American principles of military freedom of navigation in the region; and this constitutes a significant challenge in waters where China claims territorial jurisdiction in violation of the UN Commission on the Law of the Sea. But this should not be conflated with a Chinese desire or intention to exclusively “control” all the waters within the first island chain in the Western Pacific. The Chinese almost certainly recognize that exclusive control or “domination” of the neighborhood is not achievable at any reasonable cost, and that pursuing it would be counterproductive by inviting pushback and challenges that would negate the objective.

So what would Chinese “hegemony” in East Asia mean or look like? Beijing probably thinks in terms of something much like American primacy in the Western Hemisphere: a model in which China is generally recognized and acknowledged as the de facto central or primary power in the region, but has little need or incentive for militarily adventurism because the mutual benefits of economic interdependence prevail and the neighbors have no reason—and inherent disincentives—to challenge China’s vital interests or security. And as a parallel to China’s economic and diplomatic engagement in Latin America, Beijing would neither exclude nor be hostile to continued U.S. engagement in East Asia.

A standard counterargument to this relatively benign scenario is that Beijing would not be content with it for long because China’s strategic ambitions will expand as its capabilities grow. This is a valid hypothesis, but it usually overlooks the greater possibility that China’s external ambitions will expand not because its inherent capabilities have grown, but because Beijing sees the need to be more assertive in response to external challenges to Chinese interests or security. Indeed, much of China’s “assertiveness” within East Asia over the past decade—when Beijing probably would prefer to focus on domestic priorities—has been a reaction to such perceived challenges. Accordingly, Beijing’s willingness to settle for a narrowly-defined, peaceable version of regional preeminence will depend heavily on whether it perceives other countries—especially the United States—as trying to deny China this option and instead obstruct Chinese interests or security in the region.

#### Ultimately a more peaceful model

Yan 18 Yan Xuetong, Professor and Dean of Institute of Modern International Relations, Tsinghua University ["Chinese Values vs. Liberalism: What Ideology Will Shape the International Normative Order?" The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Volume 11, Issue 1, 1 March 2018, Pages 1–22, <https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/poy001>]//BPS

International mainstream values play a guiding role in establishing international norms. In keeping with this maxim, the decline of liberalism will inevitably generate challenges to the current international order which, after the end of the Cold War, found itself based on the norms established under the guidance of American liberalism. Having enjoyed a dominant status for three decades, the values of liberalism are now being challenged by the rise of competing ideologies—anti-establishmentarianism in the United States, populism in Europe, traditional values in China, Islamic fundamentalism in the Middle East, and economic nationalism in both the developed and developing countries. Although it is not yet clear which ideology will replace liberalism as the new global mainstream value, the official ideology of a rising state will have the best chance of universal adoption due to the tendency of the disadvantaged to imitate the advantaged. As China presently stands as the pre-eminent candidate in this regard, the ideologies competing for influence in its policymaking—Marxism, economic pragmatism, and traditionalism—are worthy of study. Yet, because none of these ideologies has yet proven to be as globally influential as liberalism, it is too early to predict their future. A combination of liberalist and Chinese traditional values in the establishment of a new international mainstream value will facilitate the establishment of a better international normative order. Although in decline, liberalism still wields greater influence than any other ideology at this time, but China’s rise will expand the international influence of Chinese traditional values. These two factors offer the chance to combine the Chinese traditional values of benevolence, righteousness, and rites with the liberalist values of equality, democracy, and freedom, thus modernising them in the forms of fairness, justice, and civility. Ultimately, it is the merging of these values that should prove universally acceptable to people of different countries. Furthermore, this new set of mainstream values could characterise the coming international order quite differently from that of the Cold War or post-Cold War.

#### China would be peaceful—empirics outweigh saber-rattling

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Many Chinese observers and officials have seen the writing on the wall for some time, and as early as the 1990s began reaching beyond Deng Xiaoping’s prescription of “lying low” on the global stage, and taking on more international responsibilities. Only rarely does it oppose international sanctions processes or interventions outright. At the same time, its pledges to international peacekeeping and its commitment, at least in principle, to climate change mitigation indicate a gradual opening-up. China’s interactions with the global order – whether on climate change, foreign intervention, or international financial institutions – betray a policy of cautious engagement. China relies on a stable global order to preserve the networks that support global free trade. It therefore has a vested interest in protecting that order. Therefore, where China “sets the needle” between engagement and disengagement often appears to be connected to its global economic interests. It is occasionally willing to act against its own principles to preserve good relationships, unlike Russia, which has no qualms about using its veto power at the UN Security Council. Where China draws the line on engagement often tells us more about its philosophy of global order than on what issues it does engage on. China draws the line on issues where its sovereignty – the power of its centralised state to wield total control – is threatened. The challenge China faces is how to protect a global order that guarantees its economic interests, while the Western backlash against globalisation threatens to undercut the export markets China depends on. Its gradual engagement on the world stage reveals that China is more integrated into the global fabric than it cares to admit.